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Abstract
Background: We studied how well first-year medical students understand and apply the concept of substituted judgment,
following a course on clinical ethics.
Method: Students submitted essays on one of three ethically controversial scenarios presented in class. One scenario
involved a patient who had lost decisional capacity. Through an iterative process of textual analysis, the essays were studied
and coded for patterns in the ways students misunderstood or misapplied the principle of substituted judgment.
Results: Students correctly articulated course principles regarding patient autonomy, substituted judgment, and non-
imposition of physician values. However, students showed misunderstanding by giving doctors the responsibility of
balancing the interests of the patient against the interests of the family, by stating doctors and surrogates should be guided
primarily by a best-interest standard, and by suggesting that patient autonomy becomes the guiding principle only when
patients can no longer express their wishes.
Conclusion: Students did not appear to internalize or correctly apply the substituted judgment standard, even though they
could describe it accurately. This suggests the substituted judgment standard may run counter to students’ moral intuitions,
making it harder to apply in clinical practice.
Citation: Curlin FA, Lawrence RE, Fredrickson J (2009) An Ethical Fac ¸ade? Medical Students’ Miscomprehensions of Substituted Judgment. PLoS ONE 4(2): e4374.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004374
Editor: Erik von Elm, University of Bern, Switzerland
Received August 26, 2008; Accepted December 9, 2008; Published February 4, 2009
Copyright:  2009 Curlin et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors have no support or funding to report.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: fcurlin@medicine.bsd.uchicago.edu
Introduction
Substituted judgment has become the normative criterion for
making medical decisions when adult patients cannot express their
wishes.[1–3] According to this standard, when a patient loses
decisional capacity and has not provided doctors with sufficient
guidance about what type of care he or she wishes to receive or
forego, health care providers should identify an appropriate
surrogate decision maker. They should then instruct the surrogate
to make medical decisions based on their judgment of what the
patient would most likely have chosen for himself or herself.[4]
The rationale for this, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is
that it would be ‘‘unfair to deprive an incompetent patient of
decision-making rights merely because he or she is no longer
autonomous’’.[5] This emphasis on preserving patient self-
determination emerged in the years following the Belmont Report,
when the report’s principle of respect for persons was rearticulated
as a mandate to respect a patient’s autonomy.[6] Since then,
important court cases have advanced substituted judgment as a
means for accomplishing this goal. For example, in the Earle N.
Spring case, the court applied the substituted judgment principle
to an incompetent patient who, when competent, had not clearly
expressed wishes for or against treatment, but whose family
believed he would have chosen to discontinue treatment.[7]
By promoting patient autonomy even for those who can no
longer express their own wishes, the substituted judgment standard
departs from earlier ethical norms. For centuries, medical ethics in
the West was rooted in the virtue ethics of the Hippocratic corpus,
Greek philosophers, and Christian writers. When presented with a
medical decision, physicians themselves were expected to discern
the right and good thing to do.[8] In the latter part of the
twentieth century, U.S. medical ethics shifted its focus to
maintaining four principles: nonmaleficence, beneficence, auton-
omy, and justice.[8] Of these principles, autonomy is the one least
emphasized in traditional norms, but it has gradually become the
leading principle of clinical ethics.[8,9] As a result, doctors are
now taught that they are not to ask what is best for patients who
can no longer express their wishes, but rather are to respect such
patients’ autonomy even when that autonomy cannot be expressed
by the patients themselves.[10] Thus medical ethics has shifted
from emphasizing best interest to emphasizing autonomy; from
informed consent to patient choice.[9]
When medical students encounter the principle of substituted
judgment, and learn that they are not to apply a best interest
standard to medical decisions for incapacitated patients, they may
not recognize the significance of this historical paradigm shift, nor
easily abandon traditional ethical constructs and internalize the
new system. If students do not internalize the ethical principles
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principles when they enter the professional world. To examine this
subject further, we reviewed the ways twenty-nine medical
students analyzed the ethical dimensions of medical decision-
making for a patient who had lost decisional capacity. Our goal
was to describe ways that students comprehend, and potentially
miscomprehend, the substituted judgment standard and the
principles behind it.
Methods
The final assignment in the quarter-long (15 classroom hours)
Doctor-Patient Relationship course at the University of Chicago
Pritzker School of Medicine asks first year students to analyze the
ethical issues raised in one of three cases presented by ‘‘Intensive
Care,’’ a NBC Dateline television program aired August 9, 1996.
One case involved a middle-aged, homeless woman who was
brought to the emergency room after suffering a massive
intracranial hemorrhage. She was profoundly obtunded, possessed
medication for schizophrenia, and showed signs of a previous
stroke. The clinicians who evaluated her believed that medical
interventions could preserve her life, but that it was very unlikely
that she would recover much, if any, functional or communicative
capacity. Faced with the decision of whether to operate or institute
palliative care, the medical team tried in vain to locate family
members. Members of the team believed surgical intervention was
not in the best interest of the patient, but they decided to perform
the procedure anyway because their knowledge of public opinion
data (invoked as a proxy surrogate) suggested that most families of
patients in similar clinical scenarios would choose medical
intervention. After an emergency craniotomy was performed, the
patient’s son and daughter were located, and both reported that
their mother would not have chosen to undergo the operation had
she been able to express her wishes. The patient never regained
consciousness and died five months later of complications.
Medical students were asked to write a brief essay about this
vignette according to the following instructions: ‘‘Discuss how
surrogate decision-making differs from routine decision-making.
Reference the textbook and other class readings. Should
physicians give equal weight to an individual’s decisions for
herself/himself compared to a surrogate’s decisions for the
individual? Give an example.’’
For the purposes of this analysis, students who completed the
course in 2005 were emailed and asked for permission to study
their essays after removing all identifying information; 104
students were asked, 77 consented to have their essays included,
26 did not respond, and one declined. The study data includes the
29 essays which addressed the vignette described above. The
remaining 48 essays were excluded from this study because they
discussed a different vignette altogether.
Through an iterative process of textual analysis, the authors
reviewed the essays looking for patterns in the way students
described, interpreted, and applied the substituted judgment
standard. First, two investigators (JF, FC) each read through
several essays, coding them for themes and patterns. They then
met together to develop a codebook specifying the prominent
concepts and themes. JF and RL coded all twenty-nine essays
according to the codebook, adding new codes where they
emerged. Some passages had multiple implications and were
given more than one code. FC and RL then cut and pasted
relevant coded parts of the text into an outline of the prominent
themes (resulting in over 30 pages of quotations organized by
theme). Finally RL synthesized the findings into the concise
presentation that follows—emphasizing, and providing quotations
to illustrate, the most prominent patterns and themes (individual
essays are indicated using the notation E1 to E29).
This process of textual analysis employed three principles that
help to strengthen thecredibility ofthefindings andto guard against
inaccurate or arbitrary interpretations of textual data. First,
following the principle of constant comparison, the investigators
examined each transcript in relation to the others to ensure that
thecodebook and ourevolving interpretationof the findings reliably
followed from the data.[11] Second, different investigators read the
data and collaborated to come up with a shared interpretation.
Bringing to bear multiple perspectives in data analysis and
interpretation strengthens the credibility of the findings and is
known as investigator triangulation.[12] Third, although we reviewed
all 29 essays, we reached theoretical saturation—the point at which
subsequent essays did not reveal substantial new themes[13]—after
coding roughly half of the essays.
Results
Students accurately reproduced the ethical principles taught in
the course. They espoused the primacy of patient autonomy,
saying ‘‘patient preferences must always come first’’ E29. They correctly
summarized substituted judgment, indicating the surrogate
‘‘…must make decisions that best approximate what the patient preferences
would have been…’’ E2. And many directly cited the class’s primary
text which warned, ‘‘Surrogates must be careful to avoid the common ethical
pitfall of injecting their own values and beliefs into the decision-making process,
as only the patient’s values and beliefs are relevant to the decision’’ (p85).[14]
Thus, students appeared to be able to recapitulate the principles
and use the standard vocabulary they were taught.
However despite explicitly endorsing substituted judgment, with
its accompanying principles of autonomy and patient self-
determination, students tended to judge the physicians’ actions
by standards which are not consonant with the substituted
judgment standard. For example, students expected the physi-
cians, in their role as decision makers, to balance the patient’s
wishes with the desires of the family. One student claimed,
… the possibility of the patient persisting in a vegetative state could
prove burdensome for the surrogates should they assume responsibility for
care of the patient upon release from the hospital. [Thus]… doctors
should equally consider both the wishes of patients and those closest to
them. E13
Another wrote, ‘‘…one of the physicians’ main goals was doing what
they thought the family would want; that is pleasing the family’’ E3.
Students did not seem to recognize that for physicians to make
decisions based on the family’s wishes or the physicians’ own
judgments about the family’s needs is not compatible with an ethic
of substituted judgment and patient self-determination.
Substituted judgment is based on patient autonomy,[5] yet
while students agreed that patient autonomy must guide decisions,
they often steered rhetorically toward the notion that best interest
should be the primary guide for physicians and surrogate decision
makers. For example, concerning the decision to invoke public
opinion data as a proxy surrogate, one student commented, ‘‘I
wonder if using this rationale to make a decision was truly based on what was
in the best interest of the patient’’ E11. Another stated, ‘‘Ultimately, as
many of the physicians in the video stated, the surrogate must decide what is in
the patient’s BEST INTEREST’’ (emphasis in original) E23. Others
presented substituted judgment as subordinate to best interest,
saying ‘‘If… the physician thinks that the surrogate is not truly considering the
patient’s best interest, then it might be unethical to fully weigh-in [the
surrogate’s] decision’’ E3.
Substituted Judgment
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substituted judgment standard compelled physicians to make a
decision which was not consistent with their judgment of the
patient’s best interest.
…the physicians admitted that they made the wrong decision. Rather
than respecting the dignity of [the patient], they played it safe and chose
to treat when all medical and quality of life issues pointed to
withholding life-sustaining treatments. It was very interesting, however,
that the physicians admitted that they would probably choose the same
action again, despite acknowledging that it was wrong. E3
Throughout these various appeals to best interest, students did
not seem to be intentionally challenging the importance of
autonomy. Rather, they seemed to forget their earlier statements
about the need to let patient autonomy govern all medical
decisions. Ironically, some claimed that autonomy becomes central
primarily when a patient cannot express his or her wishes.
In most cases, one would expect the goal to be improving the quality of
life of the patient, generally by improving their health… [but when] a
patient presents in a coma necessitating life support to prolong life, with
little chance of recovery, the ultimate goal of the medical team becomes
respecting the patient’s preferences. E22
Students did not always understand the rationale behind the
decision to treat. Many failed to recognize the use of public
opinion data as an attempt to preserve patient autonomy. Thus
one wrote, ‘‘Certainly in this case, had her preferences been known, the
doctors surely would have respected the patient’s autonomy. Instead, the
physicians made up a family from public opinion data’’ E15. Students who
misunderstood the rationale explained the decision by suggesting
doctors based it on implied consent E9, the inability to locate
family members who objected E7, and medical indications E7.
Others suggested doctors may have been biased by the patient’s
history (stroke, schizophrenia), the patient’s current status
(homeless, uninsured), the fear of lawsuit and the irreversibility
of non-treatment, popular opinion favoring treatment, hope of
giving the patient a chance at recovery, and the desire to give the
family time to come to terms with the situation. Several students
endorsed the decision not because it preserved autonomy, but
because they believed physicians must always try to preserve life
E20, or must always err on the side of life when there is
uncertainty E11.
When evaluating the decision to treat the patient, many students
did not endorse the idea that the decision was based on a
procedural ethic, that is, an approach whose merits are
determined by the process utilized rather than the endpoint
reached. The language of ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘wrong’’ was frequently
applied based on students’ judgments of the decision’s outcome,
and whether the decision matched what were later found to be the
patient’s expressed preferences. This shows students were focusing
on the result of the decision, rather than its method.
Discussion
After a course on medical ethics, medical students still tended to
misunderstand what the substituted judgment standard requires.
In some cases their use of the right words masked a deeper
misunderstanding of the concepts at play, suggesting the possibility
that the substituted judgment vocabulary was acting as something
of a rhetorical fac ¸ade: a publicly appealing front covering a less
acceptable construct. For these students, the terminology gave the
appearance of appealing to substituted judgment standard even as
the substance of the student’s valuation was not compatible with
that standard.
In reference to a patient who no longer had decisional capacity,
students commonly suggested that the patient’s doctors should
make decisions based on their own judgments of the patient’s and/
or the family’s best interest. As such, they tended to misrepresent
the ethical reasoning behind others’ decisions and judge those
decisions based on outcomes rather than procedures. These
findings suggest that although the students could recapitulate the
ethical doctrines presented in the course, they did not realign their
ethical concepts to be in accordance with them. This raises
questions about whether training in ethics actually changes how
doctors arrive at decisions, or only changes physicians’ vocabu-
laries and the ways they defend their decisions. This also raises
questions about whether substituted judgment is a particularly
problematic standard for students to internalize.
Admittedly this study is limited by its small sample size, and its
focus on students in one classof one medical school. Thus somemight
dismiss the trend as a quirk of a particular context or might suggest
that students’ misapprehensions are a developmental phenomenon
which will be overcome by the process of medical education. Perhaps
by the time these students become practicing physicians they will
have internalized the ethics of autonomy and substituted judgment
along with the other prominent principles of contemporary medical
ethics. Additionally it is possible that students comprehend the ethic,
but struggle to write about it with clarity.
Along these lines it is worth noting that qualitative studies
among practicing physicians have shown some trends that parallel
those we observed among medical students. After interviewing 20
intensive care physicians, Alexia Torke and colleagues described
physicians actively balancing patients’ wishes against other
considerations, such as the physician’s view of the patient’s best
interest, or the surrogate’s needs and wishes. Also, physicians in
their study often allowed clinical and ethical reasoning to combine
and overlap, such that physicians were drawing on both clinical
and ethical knowledge without making clear distinctions between
the two realms.[15] (This latter trend is reminiscent of students in
our study who defended the decision based on medical
indications.) If students receive their clinical training from faculty
who do not actively and accurately implement substituted
judgment, the students are less likely to have misconceptions
challenged and corrected.
An alternative consideration is whether there is something
inherent to the ethic of substituted judgment that makes it difficult
to internalize. For many students and professionals, it may run
counter to their moral intuitions, therein making synthesis difficult.
Additionally, some scholars have noted problems with the
substituted judgment standard: patients often do not have pre-
determined preferences,[9] patients’ preferences may involve
misunderstandings of medical factors,[9] previously articulated
wishes may be hard to interpret in a given scenario,[9,16]
physicians can sway the decision making process by the way they
present information,[9] and surrogates may have ulterior mo-
tives.[17] In addition, a body of empirical studies has shown that
surrogates are often poor predictors of patient wishes.
[1,3,9,18,19,20]
Conceptually the substituted judgment standard is clouded by
problematic presuppositions. It is not self-evident to all that
substituted judgment is morally comparable to self-determina-
tion,[10] that autonomy and self-determination continue to have
meaning when severe brain-damage has occurred,[17,21] or that
patients value self-determination as much as contemporary
ethicists do.[2,9,22] Moreover, some worry that the ‘‘absolutiza-
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encourage moral detachment on the part of the physician, and
even work against the patient’s best interests’’ (p 1160).[8] To the
extent students share these concerns, they may find it difficult to
internalize substituted judgment and its related ethical principles.
Students might have an easier time with the principle if more
attention were given to its strengths and limitations, and the
contexts in which it is appropriate and inappropriate as a guiding
principle. For example, Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock
recommend surrogate decision makers first look for advance
directives (documented or by proxy), but claim ‘‘where there is no
advance directive, there is no one guidance principle appropriate
for all cases’’ (p 113).[23] They recommend employing the
principle of substituted judgment when patient preferences are
clear but being guided by a principle of best interest when such
preferences are unclear. Presenting a more nuanced view of
substituted judgment may help students understand more clearly
its underlying assumptions and the situations in which it is most
appropriate.
Finally, we cannot overlook the possibility that students’
ambiguity toward substituted judgment stems not from misunder-
standing, but rather an awareness of the moral complexity of the
situation, and an appreciation for the competing moral principles
at work. However we consider this less likely since the essays
contain little to no direct discussion about the limitations of
substituted judgment in general or the appropriateness of its use in
this setting. Rather, students tended to give superficial endorse-
ment to the principle and then analyze the situation using a
different set of principles.
Substituted judgment remains the standard approach to making
decisions for patients who lack decisional capacity and do not have
adequate advance directives, because it preserves the contempo-
rary emphasis on patient autonomy as the first principle of medical
ethics. However, in light of students’ inability to internalize the
ethic, it is worth considering whether the principle benefits patients
and the practice of medicine to the degree intended. If student
physicians view themselves as decision makers committed to
serving the best interests of incapacitated patients and their
families, then perhaps medical ethics educators should build on
that disposition by promoting models for decision-making which
take beneficence as their first principle, while clarifying the
dangers that follow if patients’ expressed wishes are not sufficiently
taken into account.
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